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Abstract
We consider the problem of pricing a single object when the seller
has only minimal information about the true valuation of the buyer.
Speci￿cally, the seller only knows the support of the possible valuations
and has no further distributional information.
The seller is solving this choice problem under uncertainty by min-
imizing her regret. The pricing policy hedges against uncertainty by
randomizing over a range of prices. The support of the pricing policy
is bounded away from zero. Buyers with low valuations cannot gener-
ate substantial regret and are priced out of the market. We generalize
the pricing policy without priors to encompass many buyers and many
qualities.
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We consider the problem of seller who has to price a given product with
minimal information about the willingness to pay of the buyer. We o￿er a
solution to the pricing problem of the seller by analyzing the pricing policy
under regret minimization.
\There always is a ￿rst time." With growing and globalizing markets the
number of situations in which market participants have little information
about their environment appears to be increasing. Market surveys can be
costly and time consuming. Unless stakes are high, with market places evolv-
ing and trading partners changing, it is useful to know how to set a price
without the need to gather additional information. The traditional decision
theory determines the optimal price according to the prior belief. Yet there
is little guidance as how to form these initial beliefs.
We formally model the problem of optimal pricing with minimal informa-
tion and build on the axiomatic literature on decision making under uncer-
tainty. The objective function of the seller is to minimize the regret from
a given pricing policy. The regret of the seller is the di￿erence between the
pro￿t under complete information and the realized pro￿t under incomplete
information. The regret of the seller can be positive for two reasons: (i) the
buyer has a low valuation relative to the price and hence does not purchase
the object, or (ii) he has a high valuation relative to the price and hence the
seller could have obtained a higher revenue. The notion of regret contains a
benchmark against which the realized pro￿t is measured and o￿ers a trade-o￿
which determines the optimal policy.1
The idea of a minimax regret rule was ￿rst suggested by Savage (1951) in
his reading of Wald (1950). A decision theoretic axiomatization of regret was
provided by Milnor (1954) and more recently by Stoye (2007). It is noteworthy
that the axiomatic foundations for the minimax regret criterion do not refer
to regret at all, rather they relax the axiom of independence of irrelevant
alternatives. Namely, the irrelevance of the alternative is only maintained if
it would not change the choice outcome under complete information. In this
way, the minimax regret criterion captures the idea of a decision maker who
is concerned about foregone opportunities, and hence the term \regret". We
wish to emphasize that the concern for regret arises from the axioms and not
from any emotional or behavioral considerations. In particular, there is no
1The notion of regret shares features with the notion of competitiveness which is central
in optimal design problems analyzed in computer science (see the recent survey to online
design problems by Borodin and El-Yaniv (1998)). The competitiveness of a policy is the
ratio (rather than the di￿erence) of realized pro￿t against maximal pro￿t under complete
information. Neeman (2003) analyzes the competitiveness of the second price auction and
Bergemann and Valimaki (2006) survey robust models in mechanism design.3
need for the decision maker to learn the true state of the world after making
her decision.
How should the seller price under the minimax regret criterion? The pric-
ing policy has to resolve the con￿ict between the regret which arises with low
prices against the regret associated with high prices. If the seller o￿ers a low
price, regret can arise through the arrival of a high valuation buyer. On the
other hand, if the seller o￿ers a high price, regret can be caused by a valuation
just below the o￿ered price. It then becomes evident that a single price will
always expose the seller to substantial regret. Consequently, the seller can
decrease her exposure by o￿ering many prices in the form of a random pricing
policy. With a random pricing policy, the seller diminishes the likelihood of
large regret.
The intuition regarding the regret minimizing policy is easy to establish in
comparison to the optimal revenue maximizing policy for a given distribution.
An optimal policy for a given distribution of valuations is always to o￿er the
object at a deterministic price. In contrast a regret minimizing policy will
o￿er many prices (with varying probability). With a single price, the risk of
missing a trade at a valuation just below the given price is substantial. On
the other hand, if the seller were simply to lower the price, she would miss the
chance of extracting revenue from higher valuation customers. She resolves
this con￿ict by o￿ering low prices to the low valuation customers with positive
probability.
We shall contrast the policy under the minimax regret criterion with the
maximin utility criterion which seeks to maximize the worst case outcome.
In the setting here, the worst outcome arises when the buyer has a valuation
below the o￿ered price. The maximin utility criterion forces the seller to set
the price equal to the lowest possible valuation (provided it generates positive
pro￿ts). This conservative point view fails to provide a trade-o￿ in terms
of foregone opportunities by focussing exclusively on the worst case scenario
from the perspective of pro￿ts.
The current analysis complements our earlier work on robust monopoly
pricing in Bergemann and Schlag (2007). There we considered a robust version
of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing with incomplete informa-
tion. In the robust version of the problem the seller only knows that demand
will be in a small neighborhood of a given model distribution. We charac-
terized the optimal pricing policy under two distinct, but related, decision
criteria with multiple priors: (i) maximin expected utility and (ii) minimax
expected regret. The resulting optimal pricing policy under either criterion
depends on the model distribution and the size of the neighborhood. In the
current contribution we do not allow for any prior information about the val-
uation of the buyer nor do we allow for variation in the uncertainty faced by
the seller. In particular, we cannot say how the seller would be responding to4
an increase in uncertainty. The absence of prior information then allows us
to focus on the trade-o￿s inherent to an environment without information.
A recent paper by Eren and Ryzin (2006) considers a product di￿erentia-
tion problem without prior information and under regret minimization. They
consider a market with di￿erentiated products (either horizontal or vertical)
and determine the optimal product positioning without market information.
Perakis and Roels (2006) consider the inventory problem of the newsvendor
model with partial information under regret minimization.
2 Model
Consider a seller of a good who faces a single potential buyer. The seller sets
a price p for a unit of the good. The buyer wishes to buy at most one unit
of the good and has a value v, his willingness to pay, belonging to a closed
interval such that v 2 [v;1] where v ￿ 0.2 The net utility of the buyer of
purchasing the product at price p is given by
u(v;p) = v ￿ p.
The marginal cost of the seller is constant and equal to c 2 [0;1), and the cost
c is incurred only if the good is sold. The pro￿t of the seller equals
￿ (p;v) , (p ￿ c)Ifv￿pg; (1)
where Ifv￿pg is the indicator function specifying:
Ifv￿pg =
￿
0; if v < p;
1; if v ￿ p:
The value v of the good is private information to the buyer and unknown to
the seller. The only information the seller has is that v 2 [v;1]. Clearly, the
buyer purchases the good if v ￿ p and does not purchase if v < p:
We solve the problem in which the seller seeks to minimize the maximal
expected regret. The regret of the seller charging price p is determined as
the di￿erence between the maximal pro￿t the seller could make if she knew
the value v and the pro￿t she makes by setting p. The maximal pro￿t when
knowing v is given by
max
p ￿ (p;v) = maxfv ￿ c;0g,
and we obtain the following formula for regret:
r(p;v) , maxfv ￿ c;0g ￿ (p ￿ c)Ifv￿pg: (2)
2The normalization to 1 is without loss of generality and the value v can interpreted as
the relative value in relation to the maximum possible value.5
The regret is equal to the foregone pro￿ts of the seller due to not knowing
the true value of the buyer. The regret is non-negative and can only vanish if
p = v or if v ￿ c. The seller experiences strictly positive regret in two di￿erent
cases: (i) the good is sold but the buyer would have been willing to pay more,
so p < v and r(p;v) = v ￿p or (ii) the good was not sold but the willingness
to pay of the buyer exceeded the cost or p > v > c and r(p;v) = v ￿ c. An
upper bound on the valuation of the buyer is needed to ensure that the regret
is ￿nite.
The pricing policy with regret can be determined as an equilibrium strat-
egy of a zero-sum game between the seller and adversarial nature. In the
zero-sum game, the payo￿ to the seller is equal to ￿r(p;v); to nature it is
equal to r(p;v) for a given realization of price p and valuation v. (The equi-
librium behavior of the buyer is incorporated in the de￿nition of regret given
in (2)). The seller may use a mixed pricing strategy ￿ 2 ￿R and nature may
choose a distribution over valuations, denoted by F 2 ￿[v;1]: The regret
of the seller choosing a mixed pricing policy ￿ 2 ￿R given a valuation v is








A pair of strategies (￿￿;F￿) is a Nash equilibrium of the zero game if it
forms a saddle point:
r(￿￿;F) ￿ r(￿￿;F￿) ￿ r(￿;F￿); 8￿;8F: (3)
The pricing strategy ￿￿ is said to attain minimax regret and the equilibrium
strategy of nature F￿ is called a least favorable demand. The value r￿ ,
r(￿￿;F￿) is referred to as the value of the minimax regret.
The behavior in the minimax regret problem has a well-known relationship
to Bayesian decision making. The pricing policy ￿￿ that attains minimax
regret also maximizes the expected pro￿ts of a Bayesian decision maker who
is endowed with a least favorable demand F￿ as prior. In this sense it is as if
the minimax regret approach selects a speci￿c prior.
3 Pricing without Priors
The regret of the seller arises from two, qualitatively di￿erent kind of expo-
sures. If the valuation of the buyer is very high, then the regret may arise6
from having o￿ered a price too low relative to the valuation. We refer to this
as the upward exposure. On the other hand, by having o￿ered a price too
high, the buyer risks to have a valuation below the price and the regret of the
seller arises from not selling at all. Correspondingly, we refer to this as the
downward exposure. At every given price p, the seller faces both a downward
and an upward exposure. In this context, a deterministic price policy will
always leave the seller exposed to substantial regret and the regret can be sig-
ni￿cantly reduced by o￿ering a probabilistic pricing policy. We observe that
a buyer with a low valuation cannot generate substantial regret and hence we
may expect that the seller will never o￿er a price to sell to a customer with
a low valuation. Consequently, the lower bound on the valuations given by v
will only play a role in the determination of the equilibrium if it is not too
low. A critical value for the lower bound v is given by c + (1 ￿ c)=e and we
de￿ne:
￿ , maxfv;c + (1 ￿ c)=eg:
The seller may \hedge" against regret and resolve the dilemma of facing
both downward and upward exposure by \trying her luck" in a well calibrated
manner. If the seller is to be indi￿erent in her pricing policy against the least
favorable demand, then the marginal pro￿t must be zero over the range of
prices which the seller o￿ers. In the language of optimal monopoly pricing
this means that the virtual utility of di￿erent prices has to be constant and
equal to zero:
p ￿ c ￿
1 ￿ F￿ (p)
f￿ (p)
= 0. (4)
In turn for nature to be indi￿erent between di￿erent valuations, it must be
that the regret:
r(v;￿￿ (p)) = v ￿ c ￿
Z
p￿v
(p ￿ c)d￿￿ (p);
is constant for those valuations (which satisfy v ￿ c). By di￿erentiating with
respect to v we obtain:






It is now reasonable to guess that the distributions of seller and of nature
share the same support over some interval [a;b] ￿ [maxfv;cg;1]. We observe
that the upper bound of the interval has to be b = 1 as an increase in the
valuation from v = b to v = 1 could otherwise strictly increase the regret of
the seller. On the other hand, given the interval [a;1]; nature may always7
choose a valuation just below a: This choice of valuation would yield a regret
arbitrarily close to a ￿ c as the seller would fail to sell the good with prices
p ￿ a. In consequence the regret will be equal to a￿c: The value of a is lowest
if the distribution ￿￿ of prices does not display a mass point and is obtained






The equilibrium strategies are then identi￿ed by the lowest possible a
subject to (i) the indi￿erence conditions (4) and (5), (ii) the requirement
that ￿￿ and F￿ are well-de￿ned distributions and that a ￿ v. The later
conditions will imply that the least favorable demand F￿ has a mass point
at the upper end of the interval and that the pricing policy will have a mass
point at the lower end of the interval if v > c + (1 ￿ c)=e.
Proposition 1 (Pricing without Priors)
The unique minimax regret strategy is given by ￿￿:
￿￿ (p) =
￿
0 if 0 ￿ p < ￿;
1 + ln
p￿c
1￿c if ￿ ￿ p ￿ 1;
(6)
and ￿￿ has a point mass at p = v if and only if v > c + (1 ￿ c)=e:





0 if 0 ￿ v < ￿;
1 ￿ ￿￿c
v￿c if ￿ ￿ v < 1;
1 if v = 1:
(7)
Given the pair (￿￿;F￿) we need to verify the saddlepoint condition (3). The
expected regret for a given price p is





dv ￿ (￿ ￿ c) = (￿ ￿ c)ln
1 ￿ c
￿ ￿ c
; for p 2 [￿;1];
and





dv ￿ (p ￿ c) > (￿ ￿ c)ln
1 ￿ c
￿ ￿ c
for 0 ￿ p < ￿.
Similarly, the expected regret from given valuation v is
r(￿￿;v) = v ￿ c ￿
Z v
￿






= ￿(￿ ￿ c)ln
￿ ￿ c
1 ￿ c
, for v 2 [￿;1]; (8)8
and
r(￿￿;v) = maxfv ￿ c;0g < ￿(￿ ￿ c)ln
￿ ￿ c
1 ￿ c
for v ￿ v < ￿.
We have thus veri￿ed that (￿￿;F￿) satis￿es (3). The uniqueness of ￿￿ follows
as nature has to be indi￿erent over all v 2 (￿;1]:
The solution ￿￿ of the regret minimization problem simultaneously deter-
mines a least favorable demand F￿ given by (7) and a performance guarantee
for the seller in terms of the maximal regret given by (8).
We observe that if the seller were restricted to choose a deterministic price
policy, then the regret minimizing price would have to balance the upside
exposure 1 ￿ p and the downside exposure p ￿ c in a single price p.
Corollary 1 (Deterministic Pricing)
If the seller is constrained to pure strategies, then
p￿ =
￿ 1
2 (1 + c) if v < 1
2 (1 + c);
v if v ￿ 1
2 (1 + c):
The associated regret r￿ for the seller is naturally higher under the restric-
tion to pure strategies. At this point, it may be instructive to brie￿y consider
a possible alternative objective in the presence of large uncertainty, namely
to choose a price that maximizes the minimum pro￿t. Here the seller chooses






With the maximin criterion, the seller chooses a price policy ￿￿ that puts all
the mass on p = v if v > c and is indi￿erent over all prices in [c;1] if v ￿ c:
Under the minimax criterion, the seller is exclusively concerned with missing
sales at valuations above marginal cost and hence she sets the price equal
to the lowest possible valuation provided v > c. If however v ￿ c then all
prices achieve the same minimal pro￿t equal to 0 and every price above c is a
solution to the maximin problem.
4 Discussion
Robustness In this paper we considered the optimal pricing of a single
object with minimal information about the nature of the demand. Speci￿cally,
the information of the seller consisted of the interval of possible valuations
without any additional distributional information. As the seller minimized
her regret, randomization over prices played an important role. It is used to
protect the seller against su￿ering from foregone opportunities. We argued
that the optimal price policy under minimax regret can be understood in the9
classic expected utility (pro￿t) framework as an optimal pricing rule under a
speci￿c prior. Yet the randomization over many prices would never emerge
as the unique optimal pricing policy in the expected utility setting as there is
always an optimal price which is deterministic.
In Bergemann and Schlag (2007) we consider the problem of optimal pric-
ing when the seller has some prior information given by a model distribution
and by a speci￿ed neighborhood around the model distribution in which the
true demand distribution is known to be. The resulting model can be inter-
preted as a robust version of the classic problem of optimal monopoly pricing.
This paper and Bergemann and Schlag (2007) make distinct extreme as-
sumptions about multiple priors. Here, the set of multiple priors is the set of
all demand distributions, there it is a small neighborhood around a model dis-
tribution. Many intermediate scenarios are interesting for future research. In
particular, it seems natural to analyze a dynamic version of the robust pricing
problem in which the uncertainty decreases over time due to the sampling of
information.
Many Buyers We de￿ned the pricing problem of the seller as o￿ering a
single product for a single buyer with an unknown valuation. The model
and the results allow a further interpretation, namely as o￿ering the same
product simultaneously to a ￿nite number or a continuum of buyers. The
notion of regret is subadditive with equality holding when all buyers have the
same valuation and hence the problem of minimizing (average) regret when
facing many small buyers or a single large buyer leads to the same solution as
outlined in proposition 1.
Product Di￿erentiation In the current model, the buyer has a binary
choice between accepting or rejecting a single product. A natural generaliza-
tion of the model would allow for many di￿erent qualities of the same product
class as in Mussa and Rosen (1978). There, the marginal willingness to pay
for quality is constant and given by v and the cost of providing quality q is
given by a convex cost function c(q). Without prior information, the seller
would now like to o￿er a menu of qualities to as to minimize her regret. The
optimal menu (q￿ (v);p￿ (v)) would o￿er a combination of qualities q￿ (v) and
prices p￿ (v) such that the buyers would self-select and such that the regret
is minimized. With complete information, the seller would choose for every
value v, the ￿rst best quantity qFB (v) which maximizes the social surplus
v ￿ q ￿ c(q). The regret of the seller is the di￿erence between the maximal
net revenue and the realized net revenue. The regret minimization again re-
quires that the regret is constant across all types which receive o￿ers from the
seller, i.e. for all payo￿ types v with q￿ (v) > 0 and the solution of the regret10
minimization problem is given by the following di￿erential equation in v :
v ￿ q￿0 (v) ￿ c0 (q￿ (v)) = 0;
which can be solved after imposing the relevant boundary conditions.
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